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ELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS,
THE "ASSETS" TEST
— by Neil E. Harl*
 Few topics merit the attention now being focused on
health care.  While there is major concern about the cost of
health insurance and health care costs, many older individuals
are deeply concerned about nursing home costs and have seen
the estates of friends or relatives reduced sharply by such
expenses.
Some are tempted to attempt to plan their estates
deliberately to qualify for Title XIX Medicaid benefits for
health care.1 This article discusses briefly the rules
governing Title XIX eligibility.2
Tests for Medicaid Assistance
To qualify for Medicaid assistance in a participating state,
three tests must be met — (1) the Medicaid applicant must
be in a category of persons eligible to participate in the
program (the "circumstances" test), (2) the applicant's
available income must be less than a prescribed amount to
avoid having any of the income used to pay medical
expenses (the "income" test) and (3) the applicant's assets
must be within specified levels (the "assets" test).
For planning purposes, the assets test is critical and is
discussed in the paragraphs following.
Assets test.  To qualify for Medicaid, applicants may
possess only a limited amount of assets.  States set their
own asset limits and determine what assets count toward the
limit.3 Assets exceeding the limit must be spent down
before eligibility can be established for Medicaid.4
Initial eligibility determination.  At the time of
the initial Medicaid eligibility determination, a one-time
computation is made of the nonexempt assets of both the
institutionalized spouse and the "community" spouse.5 The
total fair market value of the assets is considered available to
the institutionalized spouse for purposes of eligibility.6
However, the community spouse is permitted to retain a
spousal share of assets worth up to $60,000.7 The
community spouse's assets that do not exceed the prescribed
amount at the time the institutionalized spouse applies for
Medicaid are not considered to be available to the
institutionalized spouse for purposes  of  eligibility.8  
Thus,
*
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the institutionalized spouse must deplete his or her own
spousal share down to the nonexempt asset limit and the
community spouse must deplete his or her spousal share
down to the spousal share asset limit before the
institutionalized spouse can receive Medicaid benefits.
If the total combined value of the assets is such that the
spousal share is less than $12,000, the institutionalized
spouse is permitted to transfer assets to the community
spouse to allow the community spouse to hold at least
$12,000 in nonexempt assets.9 Participating states may, in
their discretion, permit transfers allowing the community
spouse to hold up to $60,000 but the community spouse is
guaranteed a spousal share valued at only $12,000.10
A spousal share equivalent to one half of the total value
of the combined assets is also computed.11 During the period
of institutionalization and after the month in which the
institutionalized spouse becomes eligible for Medicaid, none
of the community spouse's assets is deemed available to the
institutionalized spouse.12
Asset transfers to accomplish eligibility.  A n y
asset owned by an applicant — or an applicant's spouse —
that is disposed of within 30 months of an application for
SSI is included in the applicant's resources if disposed of to
meet SSI eligibility requirements at less than fair market
value.13 Transfers of nonexempt assets made within the 30-
month period are excused from the inclusion rule if a
satisfactory showing is made that the applicant intended to
dispose of the assets at fair market value or the assets were
transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for
medical assistance.14 A determination that to set aside the
transfer would cause undue hardship excuses an otherwise
prohibited transfer.15
Medicaid qualifying trusts. Before 1986,
discretionary trusts could be used to isolate trust corpus from
beneficiaries to assure Medicaid eligibility.16 Under the 1986
amendments, amounts included in a Medicaid Qualifying
Trust (other than a testamentary trust) are considered
available to the maximum extent possible, assuming that
the trustee exercises the greatest possible discretion in the
beneficiary's favor.17 That limitation applies, however, only
to trusts between an individual and that individual's spouse
and does not prohibit discretionary trusts established by a
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child for a parent, a parent for a child or for other persons not
in a spousal relationship.
It may be helpful to include provisions in a discretionary
trust.
•  Stating that the trust's purpose is to provide assistance
to the beneficiary in addition to any public assistance
benefits including, but not limited to, Medicaid.
•  Prohibiting the beneficiary from demanding either the
trust corpus or income, leaving distributions to trustee
discretion.
•  Limiting the amount of trust income disbursed to the
beneficiary to an amount less than the applicable income
eligibility limit.
•  Avoiding limits on the trustee's discretion.18
Ethical question.  A major concern with any effort
to qualify deliberately for Medicaid benefits under Title XIX
is the ethical aspect.  The program was never intended to
provide universal benefits to everyone.  Even for transfers
more than 30 months before making application for benefits,
individuals should consider carefully whether they can live
with the ethical implications of such moves.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE.  The defendants' land included a portion
divided from the plaintiff's land by a fence constructed
several feet onto the plaintiff's land.  The defendants'
predecessor purchased the land in 1944 with the fence already
built on its present location and the evidence showed that
the fence was in existence until at least 1979.  The plaintiff
claimed that the predecessor acknowledged in 1961 that the
fence was built on the plaintiff's property but the court held
that the acknowledgement was ineffective to interrupt the
adverse possession where the fence was not moved and the
plaintiff was not given possession of the disputed area.
Livingston v. Unopened Succession of Dixon ,
589 So.2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
ANIMALS
HORSES .  The plaintiff, an attorney, was injured
when thrown off a horse while taking riding lessons at the
defendant's stables.  Before taking the lessons, the plaintiff
signed a release of the defendant's liability for injuries
suffered by the plaintiff during the riding lessons.  The
plaintiff sought to avoid the release as against public policy
and because the defendant stated that the release "didn't mean
anything."  The court held that there was insufficient public
interest or policy in horse riding to make such releases
voidable and that the plaintiff's reliance, as an attorney, on a
lay person's representation as to the legal effect of the
release was unreasonable.  Guido v. Koopman, 2 Cal .
Rptr.2d 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
BANKRUPTCY REFORM BILL
The Bankruptcy Reform Bill, S. 1985, has been
introduced in the U.S. Senate which would extend the
expiration date of Chapter 12 to October 1, 1995; create an
temporary small business chapter; make technical and
inflation adjustments; and create a National Bankruptcy
Review Commission to recommend future changes in
bankruptcy law.
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtor sought to avoid
under Section 522(f) non-possessory, nonpurchase money
liens against exempt household goods.  The trustee argued
that under the Texas exemption statute, Tex. Prop. Code §
42.001(a), encumbered property is not eligible for an
exemption; therefore, the liens could not be avoided.  The
court held that federal law controlled for purposes of
determining the avoidance of liens and the liens were
avoidable.  In re  Kelly, 133 B.R. 811 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.
AUTOMOBILE.  The debtors, husband and wife, filed a
joint Chapter 7 case and each claimed a $4,000 exemption
in their jointly owned automobile under N.M. Stat. § 42-
10-1.  The court held that since each debtor was allowed a
separate set of exemptions, the debtors could stack their
exemptions in one automobile.  In re  Jones, 134 B . R .
431 (D. N.M. 1991).
